EPSTEIN
page 8 / 28 . OCR, unverified
pledge to rebut the operative presumption and make himself eligible for release." Dkt. 24 at 2.
"Epstein contends that§ 1591 and the concomitant remand presumption do not contemplate or
cover the core conduct at issue here: performing sexual massages for money." Id. at 1-2 n.l.
Defense counsel also states that "Epstein certainly recognizes the Court's request for further
transparency and is committed to providing a complete and accurate disclosure. Accordingly,
we propose that the Court preliminarily accept the initial [financial] disclosure proffered last
Friday and, if intending to grant bail, include a release condition directing Epstein to tender a
comprehensive forensic accounting of his finances as expeditiously as practicable." Id. at 4. By
letters, dated July 16 and July 17, 2019, Defense counsel also submitted information regarding
Epstein's New Mexico sex offender registration status. Defense counsel also stated that Epstein
traveled extensively over the last eight months and "invariably returned to the to the United
States. That inescapable reality emphatically proves he won't flee and entitles him to release -
on any and all conditions the Court deems appropriate." Id. at 8.
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C. Indictment
A grand jury voted to indict Mr. Epstein on or about July 2, 2019. The Indictment
charges Mr. Epstein with two felonies involving minor girls some as young as 14. Count I
includes conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minor girls, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and
Count II includes sex trafficking of minor girls, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. It states:
"[F]rom at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005, Jeffrey Epstein, .
. . enticed and recruited, and caused to be enticed and recruited, minor girls to visit his mansion
in Manhattan, New York ... and his estate in Palm Beach, Florida, ... to engage in sex acts with
him, after which he would give the victims hundreds of dollars in cash." Indictment, dated July
2, 2019 ("Indictment"), , 2. "Moreover, and in order to maintain, and increase his supply of
victims, Epstein also paid certain of his victims to recruit additional girls to be similarly abused
by Epstein. In this way, Epstein created a vast network of underage victims for him to sexually
exploit in locations including New York and Palm Beach."
The lndictment also charges that "the victims ... were as young as 14 years old at the
time they were abused by [Mr. Epstein] ... and were, for various reasons, often particularly
vulnerable to exploitation." Id . ., 3. "Mr. Epstein intentionally sought out minors and knew that
many of his victims were in fact under the age of 18, [] because, in some instances, minor
victims expressly told him their age." Id.
Following his arrest, on Monday, July 8, 2019, Mr. Epstein was arraigned and presented
with the Indictment by Magistrate Judge Henry Pittman.
D. Legal Principles Governing Release Versus Remand
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, a Court can order a defendant's detention
if it determines that the defendant is either ( 1) a danger to the community or (2) a risk of flight.
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U.S.C. § 3142(e). A Court does not need to find both bases are proven to order a defendant's
detention. See id.; United States v. Blanco, 570 F. App'x 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2014). Dangerousness
means that the defendant is a "danger to the safety of any other person or the community." 18
U.S.C. § 3142. A finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
See. e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540,542 (2d Cir. 1995). "Where there is a strong
probability that a person will commit additional crimes if released, the need to protect the
community becomes sufficiently compelling that detention is, on balance, appropriate." United
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F .2d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 1985). "[E]ven a single incident of witness
tampering ... [ may be] sufficient to revoke bail." LaF ontaine, 210 F .3d at 134.
To order detention based upon risk of flight, the Court must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that "that no conditions could reasonably assure the defendant's presence at trial."
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); 18 U.S.C. § 3142. "[T]he
constitutional limits on a detention period based on dangerousness to the community may be
looser than the limits on a detention period based solely on risk of flight. In the former case,
release risks injury to others, while in the latter case, release risks only the loss of a conviction."
United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1048 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Orena, 986
F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1993)). A bail package that "may reasonably assure the appearance of [the